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Abstract 
The paper discusses the Heterogeneity Hypothesis about 
concepts (Machery, 2009) and the empirical support on which 
it is based. Two experiments are presented which investigate 
one of the main predictions of the theory, i.e., the fact that 
people should be willing to accept apparently contradictory 
sentences about the same entity.  
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Introduction 
The debate on the acquisition, representation and use of 
knowledge about categories and concepts has been a 
constant hallmark of psychological research for almost a 
century. The discussion was particularly animated during 
the ’70s giving raise to opposing theories. Concepts were 
considered as variously represented by rules, prototypes or 
exemplars (Smith & Medin, 1981). The attempt to define 
which theory could best explain the empirical findings 
proved vain, even when data from neuropsychological 
research and neuroimaging were taken into account. As 
argued by Murphy (2002), it seems now clear that all these 
theories are, to a greater or lesser extent, wrong and that 
new ways of thinking about this issue are required. These 
could be represented by the so-called hybrid theories of 
concepts or by more radical positions such as the 
Heterogeneity Hypothesis (HH), put forward by Machery 
(2009), which casts doubt on the usefulness of the very 
notion of concepts within psychology. 
In the paper the essential features of the HH and its 
empirical validation are illustrated. Two experiments are 
then presented which investigate one of the main 
ramifications of the HH: the fact that people should be 
willing to accept apparently contradictory sentences about 
the same entity. Experiment 1 replicates the procedure 
utilized in Machery and Seppälä with the goal to establish 
whether people could hold multiple concepts for the same 
category. In addition Experiment 2 tests the possibility that 
this effect could be modulated by the conceptual framework 
adopted in evaluating a sentence, an idea already put forth 
by Hampton, Dubois, and Yeh (2006) who were however 
unable to corroborate it. 
The Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
Heterogeneity Hypothesis (Machery, 2009) challenges the 
dominant conceptions, which assume that all concepts, 
however represented, share the same set of properties. These 
properties are used to explain our high-level cognitive skills: 
how we categorize, reason inductively, draw analogies, etc. 
It is known that each cognitive process can be variously 
realized. In fact, there are different ways to reason 
inductively, to categorize, or to make analogies. The 
dominant conceptions (what Machery calls the Received 
View) take for granted that these activities are based on the 
same type of knowledge. Such being the case, it is however 
difficult for them to explain where this diversity originates 
from. 
The HH assumes that, for each category, there exist 
different kinds of concepts that have little in common 
beyond coreferentiality (i.e., the fact that they refer to the 
same entity). Empirical evidence suggests the existence, for 
each category, of at least three separate types of concepts 
capable of storing knowledge of different kinds: prototypes, 
sets of exemplars and the so-called theory-theories.
Prototypes represent typical or cue-valid properties of a 
concept. Furthermore, a concept can be represented 
(extensionally) through the set of its exemplars. Finally, the 
theory-theories analyse a concept in terms of a causal, 
nomological or functional theory about the members 
forming the concept extension. Thus, according to the HH, 
different representations for the same category (i.e., different 
concepts) can simultaneously coexist and be used (in a 
many-to-many relation) by different cognitive processes 
giving rise to the variety with which they occur. 
So-called hybrid theories provide a different explanation 
for this diversity. These theories claim that each category is 
represented by a single concept, which can be composed by 
different parts. Hybrid theories also assume that the distinct 
parts of a concept can be employed in different forms of the 
same cognitive process. For example, Osherson and Smith 
(1981) claim that a concept is composed by two parts: a set 
of properties, that are necessary and sufficient to define the 
concept, and a prototype. These components come into play 
in two distinct form of categorization: one based on 
prototype similarity and the other on definitions. 
Different predictions about the output of the cognitive 
processes could be derived by these assumptions. For the 
hybrid theories, the separate representations work together 
contributing to a consistent result. On the other hand, for the 
HH, each concept is involved in a totally separate process 
and could lead to conclusions that may be uncoordinated or 
even contradictory. 
Machery and Seppa¨la¨ (2011) empirically investigated
these predictions through an experimental procedure, 
which required the evaluation of pairs of contradictory 
sentences. Participants were asked to establish (on a seven-
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point Likert scale) how much they agreed with affirmative 
or negative classification statements. According to the HH, 
if participants accept two mutually contradictory sentences 
as true, they should be able to utilize two different concepts 
for the same category. It was further hypothesized that 
contradiction acceptance would be higher for sentences 
allowing the use of conflicting membership criteria (the 
target sentences) in comparison with those for which the 
criteria coincide (the control ones). In other words, because 
tomatoes are technically fruit but share many properties with 
vegetables, it would be possible to accept both: “In a sense 
tomatoes are vegetables” and “In a sense tomatoes are not 
vegetables”. On the other hand, control sentences like “In a 
sense lions are animals” and “In a sense lions are not 
animals” should not be considered simultaneously true due 
to the fact that lions are in fact animals and that they are also 
typical animals. So the HH allows contradiction acceptance, 
at least for certain kinds of sentences. On the other hand, 
hybrid theories, which do not allow the existence of 
multiple representations for the same category, would have 
difficulty in explaining the phenomenon. 
Machery and Seppa¨la¨ (2011) obtained findings, which 
are actually compatible with the idea that people could hold 
multiple concepts for the same category and thus support the 
HH. In their first experiment, for example, the average 
percentage of agreement with both sentences was 27.9% for 
the target pairs and 2.78% for the control ones. The 
evidence is however not conclusive due to the insufficiency 
of their statistical analyses and to some limitations in the 
experimental procedure. In order to further investigate this 
issue, we carried out the following experiment. 
Experiment 1 
The experiment aims to replicate the first study reported 
in Machery and Seppälä (2011). In comparison with the 
original experiment, greater attention is given to the internal 
validity of the theoretical constructs, to the control over the 
experimental material, and to the evaluation of the results 
through stricter statistical tests. Basically, the experiment 
asked participants to determine how much they agreed with 
the statements contained in pairs of contradictory sentences. 
The major differences with Machery and Seppälä (2011) 
consisted in the introduction of a new type of control 
sentence and in the fact that participants were divided in two 
groups. To one group (called Pair), the contradictory 
sentences were presented in pairs and participants were 
asked to evaluate them sequentially. To the other group 
(Single) every sentence was presented, and had to be 
evaluated, separately. This avoids that the assessment could 
be affected by the evaluation given to the other pair. 
Method  
Participants: 40 participants (31 females) from different 
socio-cultural background took part in the experiment. They 
were all from the Trieste area and their age varied from 20 
to 42 years (mean=26.1, sd=4.8). Participants were 
randomly assigned to the two experimental conditions (Pair
vs. Single).
Materials: In the experiment, 32 pairs of sentences were 
used. In each pair, a sentence made an affirmative statement 
and the other contained its negation. Four different kind of 
sentences were used:  
-T1: The subject of the sentence was similar to the prototype 
concept of the sentence predicate but it did not belong 
to its extension (e.g., “In a sense bats are birds”);
-T2: The subject was dissimilar to the predicate prototype 
but, in fact, it was an atypical member of its extension 
(e.g., “In a sense penguins are birds”);
-T3: The sentence subject was both similar to the predicate 
prototype and it was a member of its extension (e.g., 
“In a sense canaries are birds”).
Sentences T1 and T2 correspond to the Target sentences 
utilized by Machery and Seppa¨la¨ (2011), while T3 
correspond to their Control sentences. In the experiment, to 
fully balance the membership and typicality factors, we 
utilized another kind of statements: 
-T4: The subject was both dissimilar to the predicate 
prototype and did not belong to its extension (e.g., “In
a sense toads are birds”).
As it is apparent from the above description, the subjects 
of sentences T1 and T2, the Target sentences which allow 
the use of different evaluation criteria (typicality vs 
membership), are borderline members of their natural 
categories, while in sentences T3 and T4, which constitute 
the Control ones, they are typical members of them. Subjects 
and predicates of the sentences were balanced within each 
kind of sentence in order to obtain all their possible 
combinations. 
As a consequence of the criteria adopted in the 
construction of the materials, in T1 and T4 are true the 
negative sentences, while in T2 and T3 are true the 
affirmative ones. 
Design: We adopted a 2x2 mixed design, having the 
modality of sentence presentation (Pair vs Single) as a 
between subjects factor and the kind of sentence (Target vs 
Control) as a factor within. 
Procedure: All the sentences (64 in total) were gathered in 
a leaflet whose pages contained eight sentences each.  Next 
to each sentence was printed a line 7 cm long whose 
extreme points were marked with the labels “Completely 
disagree” and “Completely agree”, respectively. 
Participants had to indicate the degree of their agreement 
with the sentence by putting a vertical mark on the line. For 
participants in the Pair condition, each page included four 
randomly chosen pairs of sentences. In each pair, the order 
of presentation of the positive and negative sentence was 
randomized. For the participants in the Single group, each 
leaflet page contained eight different sentences drawn 
randomly from the total of 64 possible ones. 
To facilitate the comparison with the data reported in 
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Machery and Seppälä (2011) participants’ responses were 
translated into a seven-points Likert scale with marks 
comprised between 0 and 1 cm scored as 1, marks 
comprised between 1 and 2 cm scored as 2 etc. 
Result  
As discussed above, the fundamental difference between 
the predictions made by the HH and the hybrid theories 
concerns the degree to which participants are willing to 
accept mutually contradictory sentences. In fact, it is not 
easy to establish when this happens. Machery and Seppa¨la¨
(2011) used two dependent variables: (a) the percentage of 
participants giving an answer greater than or equal to 4 to 
both sentences of a pair, and (b) the absolute value of the 
difference between the answer given to the positive and the 
negative sentence of each pair. The rationale behind these 
measures is quite clear. To accept a contradiction it is 
necessary that both the positive and the negative sentence be 
considered true. Moreover, the difference between the 
scores should be small. For instance, if a member of a pair 
of sentences receives a score of 7 (corresponding to a 
“Completely agree”) and the other member a score of 4 
(corresponding, more or less, to ”not sure”), we are not 
licensed to assume that the participant holds both sentences 
as true. 
From our point of view, the criteria used in the previous 
study are not entirely satisfactory in order to establish when 
a real contradiction is present. In addition to the difference 
between the scores given to the sentences of a pair (which 
we will call Delta), the absolute value of the scores should 
be considered, too. In other words, there is a difference 
between a Delta=1 deriving from the scores of 5 and 4 and a 
Delta of the same magnitude resulting from a 7 and a 6. The 
former denotes a situation of uncertainty while the latter 
indicates a real contradiction. In addition to the dependent 
measures used in the previous study we therefore took into 
account a new variable: the Sum of the scores assigned to 
the two sentences. Contradictory sentences are, therefore, 
characterized by a small Delta and a high Sum, indicating 
that the participant was pretty confident about their truth. 
Due to space limitation, we report here only the main 
finding obtained from the experiment, i.e., the number of 
contradictions accepted by participants in the two 
experimental conditions for the different types of sentences. 
To obtain this result, in analogy with Machery and Seppälä 
(2011), we discarded from the analysis the pairs whose true 
sentence obtained a score less than 4.  This allows to take 
into account the fact that, after all, some people could ignore 
the natural superordinate class of a given concept and 
actually believe, for instance, that “In a sense carrots are 
fruit”. Of the remaining sentences, we considered accepted 
as contradictory those pairs whose Delta was less than or 
equal to 2 and whose Sum was higher than 10. Figure 1 
reports the average of accepted contradictory pairs for each 
sentence type in the two experimental conditions. 
Discussion  
The findings seem at first sight compatible with the HH. 
Similarly to what was obtained in Machery and Seppälä 
(2011), participants actually seem to be willing to accept 
contradictory statements, with acceptance higher 
(F1.38=5.733; p=0.022) for the Target sentences (T1 and T2) 
than for Control ones (T3 and T4). However, there are some 
important reservations to be made. 
First of all, it should be observed that the amount of real 
contradictions in the Pair condition is much lower than that 
expected according to the previous studies. Moreover, the 
ANOVA revealed a significant difference (F1.38 = 12.04; p =
0.001) between the Pair and Simple conditions. The fact that 
people were more willing to judge two contradictory 
sentences as true when they were presented one at a time, 
suggests, however, that contradiction acceptance could be 
better explained by the access to different aspects of the 
same hybrid representation than by the simultaneous 
activation of different concepts. 
Figure 1: Average sentence contradiction acceptance. 
This idea is based on an observation made several times 
(e.g., Braisby & Franks, 1997) that a major source of 
variability in categorization judgments derives from the 
absence of an explicit context for the task. The fact that all 
our sentences, following Machery and Seppälä (2011), are 
introduced by “In a sense...” does not help to establish a 
clear framework for categorization. It is therefore 
reasonable to believe that, when the contradictory sentences 
are presented in pairs, they are evaluated within the same 
framework (hence the lower number of contradictions). On 
the other hand, when they are presented separately, 
participants are free to choose every time the perspective 
through which the sentences are evaluated (giving thus rise 
to a higher number of contradictions). To assess the 
reliability of this hypothesis we carried out Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
Several studies on classification manipulated the context 
in which the task had to be performed (Murphy, 2002). 
Closest to our purpose is the work carried out by Hampton 
et al. (2006). In their experiment, the instructions given to 
participants contrasted a purely pragmatic classification 
context with a more technical one, and these were compared 
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with a no-context control condition. Contrary to the 
expectations, none of the dependent measures was 
influenced by the context. 
In Experiment 2 we investigated whether contradiction 
acceptance could be reduced by providing participants with 
a clear purposive context for sentence evaluation. It could 
be speculated that such a context will encourage the 
adoption of a homogeneous membership criterion, thus 
reducing the need to resort to multiple concepts for the same 
category. 
Method 
Participants: 60 University of Trieste students (48 
females), whose age varied from 18 to 53 years (mean=23.1, 
sd=8.0), participated to the experiment. They were 
randomly assigned to three experimental conditions called 
Neutral, Prototype, and Theory.
Materials: The instructions provided to participants differed 
in the context according to which they were asked to 
evaluate the sentences. For the Theory group the instructions 
highlighted the fact that concepts are structured according to 
a taxonomy based on strict membership rules. Participants 
in the Prototype condition were said that concepts are 
related according to their similarity. Finally, the instructions 
for the Neutral group did not provide any specific indication 
about the context to be adopted. 
In the experiment the same sentences of Experiment 1 
were used. In the case of Theory group, however, they were 
introduced by the expression “In a technical sense...” while 
each sentence of the Prototype condition began with the 
words “According to common sense..”. Sentences of the 
Neutral,like those of the Single condition of the previous 
experiment, started with “In a sense...”.
Design: The experiment followed a 3x2 mixed design. 
Participants were assigned to three experimental groups 
(Neutral, Prototype and Theory) which constituted the 
between subjects factor, while the sentence kind (Target vs 
Control) was the factor within.  
Procedure The procedure was identical to that employed in 
the Single condition of Experiment 1. 
Result and discussion 
Figure 2 reports the average of accepted contradictions for 
the different kinds of sentences in the separate experimental 
conditions. The first thing to note is that the results in the 
case of the Neutral context are similar to those obtained in 
the Single group of Experiment 1. In fact the conditions in 
the two experiments were identical and no significant 
difference was obtained between their results. 
In Experiment 2 a mixed ANOVA revealed the main 
effect of the different type of context (F2.57 = 3.966; p=
0.024) on the number of contradictions accepted by 
participant while no difference between the Target and 
Control sentences was found. A Tuckey HSD post-hoc test 
revealed a significant difference between the Neutral and 
the Theory conditions only (p = 0.011) while the other 
comparisons did not yield statistically significant results. 
Providing a purposive context had therefore the effect to 
reduce the number of contradictions accepted by 
participants, making the Target sentences similar to the 
Control ones. These results supports the hypothesis that the 
findings obtained by Machery and Seppälä (2011) and in 
our Experiment 1 could derive not from the simultaneous 
access to different concepts for the same category but from 
the fact that, in case of sentences presented individually, 
participants may adopt each time a different reference 
context. If this hypothesis is true, the contradictions that 
were detected may be more apparent than real and the 
support for the HH could be weaker than previously 
thought. 
Figure 2: Average sentence contradiction acceptance. 
Conclusion  
In this study we reported two experiments, testing the 
prediction made by the HH and the hybrid theories about the 
willingness to accept contradictory statements. While the 
first experiment obtained findings that seemed to 
corroborate the HH, the second experiment suggests a 
different interpretation more in line with the assumptions of 
the hybrid theories. The results of the experiments are 
however not conclusive because, as it was the case for 
“classical” theory of concepts, it is difficult to find a critical 
test that allows to discriminate between them. In any case, it 
seems clear that the adoption of a purposive context greatly 
reduces the vagueness and inconsistency in the use of 
concepts, limiting the need to resort to multiple 
representations for the same conceptual category. It remains 
to be determined whether the context could directly 
influence the process of categorization, an effect that seems 
dubious in the light of the findings reported in Hampton et 
al. (2006), or its role should be limited to the evaluation of 
classification statements. 
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